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Modern computing systems are built based on Service Oriented Architectures and are made up of 
multiple distributed components.  They often span separate and autonomous domains of administration 
and involve dynamic collaboration. Resources and services are exposed as Web Services that are a 
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Access control systems ensure that services are protected against unauthorised access. Architecting 
such systems in multi-domain computing environments poses numerous challenges that must be 
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In this paper we present a requirements analysis for architecting dependable access control systems for 
multi-domain computing environments.  In particular, we address those environments that are built 
based on SOA and use Web Services as the underlying connection technology. We refer to relevant 
standards and technologies that are of significant importance when architecting access control for such 
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Abstract. Modern computing systems are built based on Service Ori-
ented Architectures and are made up of multiple distributed components.
They often span separate and autonomous domains of administration
and involve dynamic collaboration. Resources and services are exposed
as Web Services that are a natural choice for achieving interoperability
in a heterogeneous computing environment.
Access control systems ensure that services are protected against unau-
thorised access. Architecting such systems in multi-domain computing
environments poses numerous challenges that must be considered. Such
systems must be modular, extensible and should have reusable compo-
nents. Authorisation needs to span separate and autonomous domains
of administration, scale to large user and resource bases and should be
efficient enough to handle even fine-grained interactions between highly
distributed components.
In this paper we present a requirements analysis for architecting depend-
able access control systems for multi-domain computing environments.
In particular, we address those environments that are built based on SOA
and use Web Services as the underlying connection technology. We refer
to relevant standards and technologies that are of significant importance
when architecting access control for such environments.
1 Introduction
Modern computing systems are no longer built from monolithic applications pro-
visioned from a single and central location but rely on loosely coupled compo-
nents distributed among multiple different hosts. The Service Oriented Architec-
ture (SOA) paradigm supports such a decentralised computing model. Software
is viewed as composite applications built from single units called services that
can be reused across multiple applications [32]. SOA promotes reusability of ser-
vices and eases application management and integration. Using SOA principles
allows to build systems that are scalable and can evolve easily [5].
⋆ Supported by UK Technology Strategy Board, grant nr. P0007E(’Trust Economics’).
As SOA provides a solid foundation for business agility and adaptability,
it has gained much attention from enterprises during the last decade. Services
are built, exposed and consumed by internal applications in intra-organisational
scenarios. Increasingly often those services are accessed from different adminis-
trative domains including domains of business partners or those of specialised
Service Providers [42]. Systems that span multiple administrative domains form
multi-domain computing environments and are created to enhance collaboration
on specific projects where resources and services are shared among participating
parties.
Web Service technology is a powerful distributed computing abstraction en-
abling enterprises to compose applications from resources and services located
in different organisational domains [2, 45]. Web Services fit well into SOA by al-
lowing applications and resources to be exposed as services that can be accessed
remotely [16]. This technology uses the eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
to describe service interfaces in WSDL [26] and to encode messages that are
exchanged in SOAP [8]. By using XML, Web Services provide an implemen-
tation language and platform independent interaction solution for distributed
heterogeneous systems that span beyond organisational boundaries.
Web Service-based integration of computing environments from autonomous
administrative domains poses numerous security challenges. Mechanisms used for
protecting resources and services within single organisations may not be sufficient
to provide the required level of security when access requests span multiple
domains. Different organisations may have conflicting security requirements [18]
but they may still need to interoperate by exposing a part of their resources and
services to other parties. Therefore, architecting security mechanisms for such
multi-domain environments has become a complex and error prone task that
requires a deep understanding of the functional and non-functional requirements
of each participating domain.
Access control, in particular, needs to be well understood to enable efficient
and secure collaboration between multiple parties. Organisations need to protect
their resources and services within their administrative boundaries and may need
to apply additional mechanisms at the multi-domain level. Computing systems
from different organisations may use incompatible policy languages, access con-
trol models or security mechanisms that are unable to interoperate. Integrating
them across multiple organisations poses various challenges and understanding
existing approaches to providing secure, dependable and manageable access con-
trol is necessary [31].
In this paper we aim to investigate challenges to architecting dependable ac-
cess control systems for multi-domain computing environments. In particular, we
focus on access control mechanisms for such environments. Additionally, we dis-
cuss the use of suitable policy languages and access control models. We recognise
challenges in building access control systems for multi-domain environments and
we present existing solutions that have been proposed in the literature. We focus
on those solutions that are built to support authorisation in Service Oriented
Architectures that use Web Services as the underlying connection technology.
Throughout the paper we discuss the use of widely accepted access control re-
lated standards such as XACML or SAML and their deployment in the Web
Service environment. Additionally, we discuss the use of related security stan-
dards to protect the access control infrastructure.
The remainder of the paper is organised as following. In Section 2 we in-
troduce concepts that are discussed in the paper. We present policy-based au-
thorisation mechanisms in Section 2.2. We provide an overview of XACML in
Section 2.3 and we present this standard in the context of multi-domain com-
puting environments. In Section 3 we discuss an extensive set of challenges that
authorisation systems in multi-domain computing environments need to address.
We conclude in Section 4.
2 Background
In this section we provide background information regarding concepts that will
be used throughout this paper. First, we provide an overview of multi-domain
computing environments and present their specific characteristics that are of
interest to security systems architects (Section 2.1). In Section 2.2 we provide
an overview of authorisation mechanisms in general and present them in the
context of highly distributed multi-domain computing environments. Section 2.3
is an overview of XACML which is a widely accepted standard for distributed
authorisation.
2.1 Multi-Domain Computing Environments
Multi-domain computing environments have evolved to provide means of re-
source sharing and problem solving among various institutions [34]. They are
composed of multiple separate and autonomous administrative domains belong-
ing to different entities, be it single users, departments within a company or
most typically entire organisations.
Such environments may run on collaborations in an ad-hoc fashion [47]. Those
are typically peer-to-peer based bilateral collaborations where partners do not
need to have previously established trust relationships. Collaborations between
multiple domains can be also in the form of federated environments. Such en-
vironments are designed to simulate a similar environment to a single domain
with pre-established trust-relationships between all collaborating partners.
A multi-domain computing environments, when composed to address a spe-
cific business or science related problem, is often referred to as a Virtual Or-
ganisation (VO), as described in [34]. Such environments support collaboration
between parties of specific expertise. A high-level view of a multi-domain com-
puting environment in the form of a Virtual Organisation is depicted in Fig.
1. Each member of the Virtual Organisation has its own resources (WS) pro-
tected by policy enforcement points (PEP). Policies are stored by administration
points (PAP) and are evaluated by decision points (PDP). Policy enforcement,
Fig. 1. Multi-domain computing environment forming a Virtual Organisation [44].
decision and administration points constitute the building blocks of a general
policy-based authorisation system that we shall discuss in Section 2.2.
Individuals and institutions that constitute Virtual Organisations share data
and applications implemented as resources or services. Due to the highly dis-
tributed nature of shared resources and a limited trust between collaborating
partners such sharing needs to be controlled. Resource providers and consumers
need to be able to define clearly and carefully how resources are provisioned, who
is allowed to access those resources and what are the conditions under which ac-
cesses may occur. Additionally, sharing relationships can vary dynamically over
time [34, 25]. This includes resources, involved in sharing, participants of the
computing environment that wish to access those resources and access control
rules that exist.
There are different types of multi-domain computing environments. They can
differ in the purpose of being established, their scope, size, duration, structure,
community and sociology [34]. Those characteristics influence authorisation sys-
tems that need to be employed by such environments. An example would be
where the size of a multi-domain computing environment determines the dis-
tribution of components of the access control mechanism and has impact on
efficiency of the protocols used for authorisation. Duration of such environment
and communities being involved influences the way permissions are assigned to
entities. In highly dynamic environments access relationships may not involve
an explicitly named set of individuals but may be defined implicitly by autho-
risation policies. Those policies can contain rules for participants with certain
capabilities or levels of trust rather than for those that have specific identity
credentials or roles.
2.2 Access Control in Multi-Domain Computing Environments
Access control (authorisation) protects resources against unauthorised disclo-
sure and unauthorised or improper modifications. It ensures that every access
is controlled and that only authorised accesses can take place [55]. In case of
single host computing systems access control can be performed by establishing
a logical barrier around this host and by analysis of every access request. In case
of multi-host and distributed computing environments a more flexible authori-
sation architecture is required. In such environments creating a simple logical
barrier around a group of distributed services is neither feasible nor desirable.
Access control can be discussed at different levels of abstraction. This includes
access control policies, access control models and access control mechanisms [55,
33]. Policies describe how access is managed and who, under what circumstances,
may access which resources. Mechanisms enforce policies and define how access
requests are evaluated against those policies. Access control models bridge the
gap between high-level policies and low-level mechanisms by defining means of
how access control rules should be applied to protect resources. Such models
are defined mostly in terms of subjects and objects and possible interactions
between them [33].
Various access control policies have been proposed including mandatory, dis-
cretionary and role-based policies [55]. In discretionary access control (DAC)
policies control access based on the identity of the subject and on access control
rules that define allowed operations on objects. Mandatory access control (MAC)
policies control access based on centrally mandated sensitivity levels (classifica-
tions) of protected resources and authorisation levels of subjects (clearances).
Role-based access control (RBAC) allows to compose access control policies that
map naturally to an organisation’s structure [56, 55]. Access control decisions are
made based on roles that individual subjects may possess and rules that are ap-
plied to resources. RBAC merges the flexibility of explicit authorisations with
additionally imposed organisational constraints. As such, RBAC is well suited
for distributed environments that need to address protection requirements for a
large base of subjects and objects.
Access control policies may contain positive statements (positive authori-
sations) or negative ones (negative authorisations). Positive statements define
what actions can be performed on what objects by which subjects. Negative
statements define what actions are not allowed. Negative statements are usually
used to impose additional constraints on policies and to support various access
control models. They allow to define such constructs as conflict of interest or
separation of duty. In case positive and negative statements are defined in a way
that a conflict arises then policy conflict resolution protocols are used. We shall
discuss challenges related to policies in multi-domain computing environments
in Section 3.1.
Resources and services in distributed environments do not handle autho-
risation by themselves but offload it to specialised services. Such externalised
authorisation has been known for many years now and has been first discussed
by Woo and Lam in [61]. They proposed a generalised access control policy lan-
guage and a contracting protocol for offloading access control from end servers
to specialised authorisation servers. In their model, services simply need to en-
force authorisation but delegate the decision making process to other specialised
components.
In general, externalised policy-based authorisation mechanisms rely on four
main components:
1. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The PEP component is responsible for
enforcing access control policies. It creates a barrier around the resource it
protects and mediates all accesses to this resource. It conforms to decisions
that are made by other components.
2. Policy Decision Point (PDP). Evaluates access request decision queries
issued by enforcement points. PDP has access to the set of policies and
evaluates access requests against applicable policies.
3. Policy Administration Point (PAP). The PAP components provide ad-
ministrators the ability to insert policies into the authorisation system. They
usually have interfaces or provides high-level tools for policy composition.
4. Policy Information Point (PIP). PIPs are used to provide information
that can be used during evaluation of access requests. They may gather
attributes related to subjects, objects and the environment in which access
requests are performed.
We shall present the above mentioned components when presenting two sim-
ilar policy-based authorisation architectures in Sections 2.2 and 2.2.
There are numerous advantages of externalising security and authorisation
in particular and providing them in a modular-type architecture. Applications
can be composed from business services and services that address various non-
functional requirements of the applications. In such applications business logic
is well separated from authorisation which is an orthogonal functionality. Au-
thorisation can be managed independently and plugged easily into composite
distributed applications without the need of prior knowledge about those appli-
cations [36].
Security policies can be written independently by security specialists, service
owners or administrators and do not need to be coded at the same time and
in the same package as business services. This facilitates audits and checks of
security policies for the purposes of correctness, governance and compliance. As
business services in SOA can be used to compose arbitrarily complex applica-
tions, such checks and audits are of significant help in anticipating problems
before they occur. Changes to security policies can also be easily introduced in
order for the computing system to comply with changing security or compliance
requirements. This can be done without the need of modyfing business services
as they do not re-implement full authorisation and are relieved of the task of
making authorisation decisions.
When authorisation is offloaded to specialised components then possibly more
accurate authorisation decisions can be made as well [61]. This is because au-
thorisation services often have a more detailed view of the entire computing
environment and may introduce useful information into their policy evaluation
process. As authorisation services provide their functionality for a group of busi-
ness services, typically the entire computing system or administrative domain,
a consolidated view of security within such a system is possible to achieve. This
may provide for better manageability as standard management tools can be
developed for the entire system. Additionally, authorisation services easily con-
tribute to uniformity of accounting and auditing functions as discussed in [61].
Interactions between the decision (PDP) and enforcement (PEP) points can
be based on one of the three proposed authorisation decision query sequences.
Those have been discussed in existing authorisation frameworks such as the
Generic AAA Architecture presented in [27], Authorization Framework pre-
sented in [59], the Access Control Framework described in the ISO/IEC 10181-
3:1996 recommendation [52] or the Conceptual Grid Authorization Framework
and Classification proposed in [49]. Those are the agent, pull and push sequence
models.
The agent model is a proxy-based approach where a specialised component
sits in front of an exposed service and mediates all access requests to this service.
The service can only communicate with the agent and does not accept access
requests from other sources. In the push model, the access request is made di-
rectly to the service, which is responsible for sending it to a decision component
of the authorisation system. When such request is valid, the client is given ac-
cess to the service. In the pull model, it is the client that communicates with
the decision component and obtains some sort of a credential to access a specific
service. Such component then decides about the access and may allow the client
to communicate with the service.
The agent model constitutes a decentralised approach to access control policy
management. Policies need to be expressed, managed and enforced in distributed
agents that are located at the perimeter of every domain where services are
enforced. A single administrative domain may have multiple subdomains where
services are located and may require multiple agents to control access to those
service. In case of push and pull models, policies can be managed centrally and
applied to a wide group of services located in different domains. Therefore, both
solutions fit well into SOA as they provide means of centralising authorisation
information in specialised servers [33].
The push and the pull model of authorisation decision query can be pre-
sented by comparing two distinct authorisation mechanisms. The first one is the
capability-issuing mechanism that uses the push model. The client first authenti-
cates with a specialised component and obtains appropriate credentials to access
a specific service. Such credentials are then passed along with the access request
to the service. They can be attached to the message as an assertion, which upon
verification by the service, results in access being granted or not.
The pull model can be well presented by discussing the policy-issuing access
control mechanism. In such mechanism the client is only concerned with invoking
the business service. Such service is then responsible for communicating with the
appropriate decision component to determine whether access request is valid or
not.
Both approaches to access control are similar in terms of the general structure
and syntax but differ in terms of their execution semantics. They have different
trust relationships and interactions between components of the security archi-
tecture [44]. In the next two sections we shall present the push and pull model of
authorisation decision query by presenting two distinct policy-based access con-
trol mechanisms. The capability-issuing mechanism uses the push model while
the policy-issuing mechanism uses the pull model. Both access control mecha-
nisms use policies for their authorisation decision making process.
Capability-Issuing Security Architecture. A capability-based authorisa-
tion infrastructure features a trusted capability service [44] that can be used by
clients of business services. This capability service makes authorisation decisions
and can be viewed as a Policy Decision Point. Referring to Fig. 2, a client is-
sues a capability request (I) which is evaluated by this service against applicable
access control policies. The capability service replies with a capability response
(II). This response includes signed assertions that contain information about the
action that can be performed by the subject on an object. Such response may
pose additional constraints on the capabilities that are issued. This may include
information about the period of time in which a particular capability is valid.
The subjectm, which requested capabilities, can include them, typically in form
of assertions, in business service calls (III). Such assertion is then extracted on
the service side and validated for its integrity and authenticity. Only then the
enforcement point checks whether the capability is sufficient and access to a
resource is granted or not (IV).
In general, capabilities can be encoded by the capability service using differ-
ent technologies. Therefore, the form of capabilities is simply system dependent.
In case of Web Services, capabilities are usually encoded as SAML assertions.
However, they can be easily encoded as X.509 certificates as well. In any case,
assertions are typically included in the header of the SOAP message that is sent
by the client.
Fig. 2. Capability-issuing approach to authorisation in computing environments [44].
The enforcement point of the resource provider have an established trust rela-
tionship with the capability and credential services, as shown in Fig. 2. Therefore,
it can validate capabilities that are sent by the client. The enforcement point of
a resource provider simply needs to have access to trusted public key certificates
of those services and is able to technically assert a trust relationship with those
services.
In capability-issuing approach the policy decision making process is dis-
tributed within the computing environment. Even though the capability service
may assert that a client can access a resource, the resource provider still makes
the final access control decision. This allows using the capability service to pre-
screen clients and issue capabilities based on general information. The resource
providers may impose their own restrictions on access requests.
There are two-well known examples of a capability-based access control sys-
tems. Those are the Community Authorization Service (CAS) [54] which pro-
vides security for Globus and Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS)
[15, 44]. Both solutions differ with respect to the format of the capabilities that
are issued and the granularity of capability-enriched access requests. The CAS
system uses SAML assertions for capability encoding while the VOMS system
uses extended X.509 certificates for this purpose.
Policy-Issuing Security Architecture. In policy-issuing authorisation archi-
tectures clients are not required to obtain any attributes and pass them to the
service or resource that they wish to access. Access requests are made as usual
and it is up to the security mechanism on the service side to obtain a decision
whether those requests are valid or not. A policy-issuing security architecture is
depicted in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Policy issuing approach to authorisation in computing environments [44].
Referring to Fig. 3, when the enforcement point intercepts an access request
(I) it describes it by creating an authorisation decision query that is sent to
a decision point (II). This authorisation query contains information about the
subject of a request, be it a user or another service, the target and action which
has been requested (e.g. reading or writing). Policy Decision Points can request
additional information about the environment in which the access request is
being performed. This may include the time of an access request or a possible
history of previous access requests made by this client [29]. Those components
evaluate access requests and decide whether access should be granted or not.
Authorisation decision response is then returned to the enforcement point (III)
which adheres to this decisions and fulfils additional obligations. The PEP then
grants or denies access to a resource (IV).
Single decision points can be used for each administrative domain, while en-
forcement points need to be located in every place where access control must be
enforced. PDP components have engines that are capable of determining whether
a particular access should be granted or not. They evaluate the authorisation
query against a policy or a set of policies which, similarly to capability-issuing
security architectures discussed in Section 2.2, are retrieved from a policy repos-
itory handled by the Policy Administration Point. Decision points additionally
obtain information that can be useful during the decision making process. This
information is retrieved from the PIP component.
2.3 XACML Overview
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is one of the ap-
proaches to provide an interoperable solution to authorisation in highly dis-
tributed and multi-domain computing environments. XACML is an OASIS stan-
dard that aims to specify the following:
1. General purpose access control policy language;
2. Access control decision request/response protocol.
The access control policy language provides syntax in XML for defining action
(type of request) rules for subjects (users) and targets (resources). The autho-
risation request/response protocol defines a format of messages and the infor-
mation flow between enforcement and decision components of the authorisation
system. Attributes that are exchanged between components of the system can be
encoded using the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [6]. SAML al-
lows to exchange standard authorisation data between components. An example
would be when a capability service issues SAML assertions to encode capabil-
ities that are later consumed on the resource side by the enforcement point.
The SAML profile for XACML defines how to use SAML to protect, transport,
and request XACML schema instances and other information in XACML-based
authorisation systems [4].
XACML supports interoperability between domains of trust so that separate
components of the security architecture can work together across domains. It
aims to replace proprietary policy languages or formats that apply to specific
applications only. This enables a consolidated policy view across the entire com-
puting environment. Defining a standard XML-based syntax also aims to address
management related issues. It eases development of standard management tools
and toolkits that would serve common policy needs. Those tools can be deployed
in a centralised manner to reduce operational costs [50].
The request and response protocol that XACML defines is based on the ex-
change of an XACML context. XACML-conformant PEPs issue requests and
receive responses from XACML PDPs in form of such context. We shall not
discuss cases where PEPs cannot issue XACML contexts. This can be solved
by introducing an intermediate component, which would convert between the
request/response format understood by the PEP and the XACML context for-
mat understood by the PDP [3]. The XACML data flow diagram along with the
enforcement and decision components is depicted in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. XACML Data-flow diagram [3].
The data flow model of XACML, as presented in Figure 4, follows the pull
model of the authorisation decision query sequence. The access request is re-
ceived by the PEP component which then communicates it to the decision point.
PDP evaluates the access request with regards to the applicable policy set, pol-
icy or rule and replies with an authorisation decision. To make a decision, PDP
components obtain attributes associated with the client issuing an access re-
quest, the resource that is being accessed and the environment in which access
request is taking place. Such attributes are retrieved from information points.
Decisions, which are made by PDPs, do not only specify whether access
should be granted or not but may additionally impose certain obligations on
enforcement points. Those obligations are an important mechanism of the au-
thorisation system [28]. They allow to define actions which the enforcement point
must perform prior to giving access to the client. Therefore, obligations allow
to minimise the list of policies that need to be composed. Administrators can
introduce parameterised actions into the policy enforcement stage. An example
would be when resources should be encrypted before being provisioned to the
client and the strength of such encryption must depend on attributes of the
client, the resource or the environment. XACML does not specify how policy
obligations should be defined within authorisation decision messages. Therefore,
a bilateral agreement between the components of the authorisation system must
exist as enforcement points need to understand obligations defined within poli-
cies stored by administration points [3].
The use of XACML or SAML assumes and requires trust between compo-
nents of the security infrastructure. However, none of those standards includes
provisions to establish or guarantee such trust. SAML, for example, is not con-
cerned with guaranteeing confidentiality, integrity, or nonrepudiability of the
assertions which are in transit. For the purposes of secure communication, those
standards refer to XML Encryption [1] and XML Digital Signature [14] or to
other mechanisms provided by the underlying communication protocol and plat-
form [53]. Security is not only provided at the message level with such standards
as the above mentioned ones and but at the transport protocol level as well.
When Web Services are used for communication between components of the ac-
cess control system then the underlying HTTP protocol is secured with such
mechanisms as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [35] or its successor Transport Layer
Security (TLS) [30].
XACML in Multi-Domain Computing Environments. The XACML stan-
dard aims to provide authorisation for highly distributed computing environ-
ments. This standard along with ongoing research on its extensions fits well
into authorisation systems for multi-domain computing environments. This can
be considered from different perspectives including the modularity of the system
and its ability to span distinct domains of administration, the ability to compose
policies or policy sets from distributed sources and providing means of XACML
policy administration within the computing environment. Because policies and
messages exchanged between components of the access control system are en-
coded using XML, problems with interoperability between XACML compliant
components can be minimised.
The first feature of XACML, which allows its deployment in multi-domain
computing environments, is tightly related to its SOA-style architecture where
components are exposed and consumed as services. Such services can be inte-
grated in a loosely coupled manner and can be re-used depending on the require-
ments of the authorisation system that must be provided. Multiple enforcement
points can use different decision points of their choice. Those decision points
may be located in separate administrative domains and use arbitrarily chosen
information and administration points for attribute and policy retrieval. As poli-
cies use a common language in terms of syntax and semantics they can be easily
used in all domains that form a computing environment.
In XACML, policies can be composed of a variety of distributed policies
and rules that can be possibly managed by different organisational units [50].
Therefore, rules in such policies may have contradicting meanings. An example
would be when there is more than one applicable policy, one that allows access
to a resource and one that forbids such access. XACML describes the use of
combining algorithms which support access control decision making process.
Decisions can be derived from multiple rules (rule combining algorithms) or
multiple policies (policy combining algorithm). In both cases it is up to the
systems administrator to define which combining algorithms should be used (e.g.
first applicable, deny overrides, etc.). A more detailed explanation of available
combining algorithms can be found in [3].
Another important feature of XACML that supports its adoption by large
scale distributed environments is policy administration which is supported by
various XACML profiles. This includes the XACML Administration and Dele-
gation profile [13] which extends policy schema to describe delegation policies.
This profile also extends the request context schema to describe administrative
requests. Another XACML profile to address security needs in multi-domain
computing environments is the Cross-Enterprise Security and Privacy [11] pro-
file. It describes mechanisms to authenticate, administrate, and enforce authori-
sation policies and aims to protect information residing within or across separate
administrative domains. Various extensions exist for XACML that address ad-
ministration of XACML policies as well. The one presented in [44] proposes an
XACML-based access control policy model for XACML policies and addresses
the problem of rights delegation.
3 Challenges
Building secure and dependable authorisation systems for multi-domain com-
puting environments poses numerous challenges. Such environments have signif-
icantly different requirements for access control than those in closed systems. At
first, authorisation must not only follow requirements that are common for SOA
such as modularity, extensibility or re-usability [17]. Such authorisation needs to
span separate and autonomous domains of administration, scale to large base of
users and resources and should be efficient enough to handle even fine-grained
interactions between highly distributed components.
In this section we shall investigate challenges related to access control policies
and architectures of access control mechanisms. We will highlight the importance
of each challenge and discuss possible solutions to address investigated problems.
3.1 Access Control Policy Challenges
Policies that define access control rules need to address a wide spectrum of
subjects and objects that the authorisation system aims to protect. As far as
subjects are concerned, access control policies must be able to scale to a large
user base and should be able to address the heterogeneity of subject credentials.
Access control decisions should be made based on attributes of subjects and
not their identities as those may not be known a priori in dynamic distributed
environments. As far objects are concerned, authorisation policies should be ap-
plicable to their wide spectrum accessible over various protocols. Moreover, the
access control system should provide means of making decisions based on mul-
tiple policies with possibly different syntax and semantics. Therefore, providing
interoperability at the level of access control policies is a necessity. Policy con-
flict resolution protocols must exist to support decision making process when
applicable policies come from separate administrative domains.
Heterogeneity and Distribution of Subjects and Objects. The authori-
sation infrastructure should be able to address security of a highly distributed
environment of possibly heterogeneous subjects and objects [39].
In case of Web Service-based environments it is necessary to be able to specify
different access control rules for different methods which are normally invoked
using a single URI. It is necessary to provide authorisation based on the content
of messages that those services exchange. The Web Services profile for XACML
[9] defines policy assertions that can be used for specifying authorisation and
privacy requirements. Such assertions may constitute policies that are specified
at the Web Service side using the WS-Policy framework [48]. In case of RESTful
Web Services, which are being introduced as a more lightweight approach to
SOA-type integration of computing systems, similar profiles to those available
for SOAP-based Web Services are not necessary. Following constraints imposed
by the Representational State Transfer (REST) architectural style, Web Services
are accessed using different URIs and it is much easier to control access to them.
As far as heterogeneity and distribution of subjects is concerned the authori-
sation system needs to take into account that subjects’ credentials will be issued
by Identity Providers (IdP) from separate administrative domains. There are
various ways of ensuring that different identity providers are capably of issu-
ing credentials that can be trusted by authorisation components. Most of these
approaches rely on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which constitutes a fun-
damental block of building trust between collaborating parties. These approaches
of trust between the authorisation system and user credentials can be:
1. Identity-based;
2. Capability-based;
3. Trust-negotiation based.
In identity-based access control systems it is the user that presents its own
identity credentials and the authorisation system may trust the party (Identity
Provider) that assures this identity. The authorisation system may simply con-
tact the Identity Provider and ask for all the information, collectively referred
to as profile, that it requires [19]. In this approach the service gets to know the
identity of the user and attributes associated with this identity. In multi-domain
computing environments the user base tends to be large and defining access
control rules based on individual identities is not efficient and often not viable.
Therefore, clients that issue access requests to services only provide their iden-
tity so that it can be used to obtain attributes, which are used to make access
control decisions. Such attributes may be in form of roles that the user is entitled
to activate for a particular access request, as already discussed in Section 2.2.
In case of capability-based systems the user does not present their identity
but obtains the required capabilities from a capability service and sends them
to the enforcement point. Such capabilities are later used for evaluation whether
access to a resource should be granted or not. This kind of approach is used in
the CARDEA authorisation system as presented in [50]. In this system access
requests are evaluated dynamically according to a set of relevant characteristics
of the requester rather than considering specific local identities. This reduces
reliance on locally defined identities to define authorisations for each potential
user. Capability-based systems allow administrators to simply define the set of
required attributes that the client needs to present to the service. As in identity-
based systems, those can be in form of roles, which the user activates to perform
a particular access request on a service.
In case of highly dynamic multi-domain computing environments user man-
agement may be much more complex and neither identity- nor capability-based
approaches of determining one another’s trustworthiness provide required func-
tionality in terms of their ease of management, user provisioning or scalability.
In such situations it may be necessary to provide mechanisms where trust could
be established without the assumption of familiarity of collaborating parties.
Such parties may use trust negotiation to assure the enforcement points that
they indeed should be granted access to a particular resource. In this process
the client and the resource provider conduct a bilateral and iterative exchange
of policies and credentials to incrementally establish trust between themselves
[46]. A more detailed explanation of trust negotiation is discussed in various
publications including [60] and [46]. The latter one presents an approach where
specialised components, called Traust servers, handle trust negotiation processes
and determine which users are authorised to access resources within their pro-
tection domains.
Context and Content-Based Access to Resources. Controlling access to
resources in a multi-domain computing environment involves defining complex
access control policies. It should be possible to specify restrictions on access re-
quests based on the context of such requests. It should be possible to declare
arbitrarily complex conditions under which an access should be granted or de-
nied. Information that can be useful for specifying authorisation policies may
include users’ administrative domains, time of access, or an environment state
[39]. As depicted in Fig. 4 in Section 2.3, the authorisation decision query se-
quence specified by the XACML model involves retrieval of attributes from the
Policy Information Point. Those attributes may refer to the subject, resource,
action and environment. PIP components may store those attributes, particu-
larly those that refer to subjects and resources, and may calculate new ones for
actions and environments during the access request.
Access control rules should be also able to address the need of a content-based
access. Such requirement, as presented in [39] in the context of XML-based multi-
domain environments, should allow resource owners or custodians to specify
restrictions depending on information contained within the resource. In case
of Web Services it is virtually impossible to predict the data contained within
the resource which is requested by the client as such data may not be static.
However, certain access control policy languages, such as the already described
XACML, incorporate the concept of obligations. Such obligations could be used
to provide the required content-based access control. As discussed in Section 2.3,
obligations are actions that must be executed before granting or denying access.
In the context of Web Services when a resource is requested then access to this
resource may be granted with the obligation to check content of the resource.
Advanced checks can be performed which can determine whether resource should
be sent back to the client or not. Because the XACML specification does not
constrain obligations and allows them to be implementation specific then they
can be used to provide the required level of content-based access control.
Policy Heterogeneity Management. When distinct administrative domains
create a federated environment most typically each domain has its own security
policy. As discussed in [39], integration of such policies entails various challenges
including reconciliation of semantic differences between local policies, secure in-
teroperability, containment of risk propagation and policy management.
There are various potential ways of approaching those challenges as discussed
in [39] and [38]. Differences in semantics between security policies, including
access control policies, could be addressed by employing one of the following
approaches. The first approach is to provide a uniform representation of access
control rules from different domains. This can be done using meta-policies which
would mediate each access request that span multiple domains. The other ap-
proach would be to enforce usage of a standard policy language that would be
used consistently throughout the entire security system. As organisations are
moving towards standardising their authorisation policies, the latter approach
is more favourable. The XACML standard aims to provide required functional-
ity of a general purpose access control language and a model of a request and
response authorisation decision protocol, as presented in Section 2.3.
Policy Conflict Resolution. Policy Decision Points evaluate access requests
against all applicable policy sets, policies or rules, which are retrieved from
designated repositories called administration points (Section 2.2). In distributed
computing systems each domain typically has its own set of PAP components
where different authorities define access control policies (Fig. 1). Such approach
allows to centralise policies that can be later applied to a highly distributed set
of resources.
It is typical that multiple distinct authorities are supported by a single au-
thorisation system. Decision components of such system may wish to retrieve
policies that reside in various policy repositories. Such solution has been adopted
by the PRIMA authorisation system where users as well as administrators from
different domains are able to delegate authorisation for resources for which they
are authoritative to other authorities [50].
As policies, which are considered during the access control decision making
process, come from different authorities then policy conflicts may arise. This is
due to omissions, errors or conflicting requirements of the administrators speci-
fying those policies [51]. When multiple policies or rules apply to the same access
request it is possible that inconsistencies may occur. This can happen when two
or more policies apply to the same subject, operation and to the same resource
and their rules are contradicting. An example is when one policy states that a
particular access request is valid while another policy forbids such access.
Policy inconsistencies may result in illegal accesses to resources or in legal
accesses being prevented. Therefore, ensuring that policy conflicts are resolved is
an important issue. Certain conflicts can be resolved before policies are deployed
within the computing environment (i.e. before those policies are sent to admin-
istration points). This process, called the static conflict resolution, is based on
static analysis of policies and applies only to modality conflicts. Such analysis
enumerates all {subject, action, target} tuples which have a different set of ap-
plicable policies. If there are two or more policies applicable to a tuple then there
is a potential conflict. Such policies must be later checked to see whether there
is an actual conflict, i.e., a positive and negative policy with the same subjects,
targets and actions [51, 41].
As stated in [3], conflict resolution in XACML is addressed with the use of
rule and policy combining algorithms, which are used for making authorisation
decisions based on policy sets and multiple rules. XACML defines following al-
gorithms for this purpose: deny overrides, permit overrides, first applicable and
only one applicable. When an XACML-compliant decision point finds two or
more policies or two or more rules within a single policy with contradicting se-
mantics then it uses one of the mentioned algorithms to make its access control
decision.
Static analysis cannot point out all conflicts in access control policies. Some
conflicts are application specific and are usually visible only at runtime once all
policies are deployed within the system. An example of such conflicts is when
rules defined in policies do not address the required principle of Separation of
Duty. Such principle may be imposed by an organisation that collaborates in
a multi-domain computing environment. One of the proposed solutions to the
problem of application specific conflicts are meta-policies that contain applica-
tion specific constraints on other access control policies [51]. Considering access
control mechanisms discussed in Section 2.2 and the environment depicted in Fig.
1, meta-policies can be placed both within each domain or can be applied to all
domains. In the first case constraints usually refer to the SoD principle where the
same client should not be able to access certain resources at the same time. In
case meta-policies are used for the entire multi-domain computing environment
then policies may address conflict-of-interest type issues according to the model
proposed by Brewer and Nash [22]. When a certain collaborating party decides
to access resources from one domain then this party is prevented from accessing
any resources from a different domain within this computing environment.
3.2 Access Control Architecture Challenges
The authorisation architecture needs to take into account arbitrarily complex in-
tegration scenarios between organisations that form a multi-domain computing
environment. It needs to address the heterogeneity of components that comprise
such architecture and it should provide means to ensure interoperability between
them. Components should be able to exchange information meaningfully when
making access control decisions. The authorisation architecture should addition-
ally be secured in a similar way to resources within the computing environment.
Communication between components should be dependable with confidentiality
and integrity of messages being preserved. Such architecture should be capa-
ble of scaling along with the environment itself while preserving efficiency of
communication between its components. Introducing new access control rules or
revoking old ones should be feasible by multiple distinct administrative bodies.
The following sections describe challenges in access control architectures in more
details.
Interoperability Between Access Control Components. Separate and
autonomous administrative domains need to cooperate in a distributed autho-
risation system. Such a system needs to maintain a consistent authorisation
strategy and each domain should have at least some knowledge of its poten-
tial collaborators throughout the entire lifecycle of the multi-domain computing
environment. Authorisation decisions that span administrative domains require
that components in every domain are capable of correctly producing, accepting
and interpreting authorisation information from a group of potentially hetero-
geneous peers. A common agreement protocol, syntax and semantics of every
piece of information that is exchanged between components of the authorisation
system is a necessity [50]. This includes interoperability at the level of language
that is used for permission specification and at the level of protocols that are
used for communication between various components of the system.
Achieving interoperability at the level of policy specification language has
been the subject of much research and numerous languages exist for specifying
access control rules [3, 7, 21, 37, 39, 20]. The eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
technology has emerged as one of the most promising approaches for those lan-
guages [39]. XML allows uniform representation, interchange, sharing and dis-
semination of information between heterogeneous system within an environment.
It constitutes a base for such access control policy languages as XACML, which
has been discussed in Section 2.3.
Standardising protocols that are used for communication between distributed
components of the authorisation system is a necessity. As discussed in Section
2.3, information flow between enforcement, decision, information and adminis-
tration points of the access control system requires multiple messages to be sent
and understood. Components of the authorisation system must agree on the
syntax and semantics of information that they wish to exchange. Protocols such
as the request/response one proposed in the XACML standard aim to achieve
that. Apart from the syntax and semantics of information exchanged between
various components, interfaces of those components should be standardised as
well. This also applies to components which expose their functionality as SOAP-
based or RESTful interfaces. In both cases those interfaces must be well-defined
and other components of the access control system must be able to invoke them.
In case of XACML-compliant components of the authorisation architecture, in-
teroperability of components and their interface definitions have been discussed
in [10] and [12].
Location of Policy Decision Points. Once an access request is made to a
resource, the enforcement point needs to contact the decision point to determine
whether access should be granted or not. The enforcement point needs to know
which decision point it must use. In distributed systems with a limited num-
ber of components of the authorisation infrastructure the relationship between
enforcement and decision points can be static. When the enforcement point is
initialised it simply checks whether a predefined decision point is available to
instantiate a communication channel with this point [61]. Such static relation-
ships between components of the authorisation infrastructure do not scale well
but are easy to design and implement.
At first, both decision and enforcement points can easily undergo a mutual
authentication. During their setup those components simply need access to each
others public keys. Mutual authentication is necessary because of two reasons.
Firstly, enforcement points need to be sure that the authorisation decision re-
sponse comes from their trusted decision point. This guarantees that enforce-
ment actions reflect applied security policies. Secondly, decision points should
only reveal decisions on authentic access request decision queries. Otherwise,
they can leak information about access control policies that are enforced within
the system.
Although static binding between enforcement and decision components in
small distributed systems is sufficient, it does not fit into large computing envi-
ronments spanning multiple separate administrative domains. At first, enforce-
ment points may delegate rights to other domains and may not wish to specify
exactly which decision points should be used. Such enforcement points may just
be satisfied with any decision that is signed by a particular administrative body.
Moreover, in case of large and dynamically changing distributed systems, a static
binding between enforcement and decision points may not be feasible. In such
cases a discovery mechanism needs to be employed.
Management of Access Control Systems. In many cases configurations of
different enforcement points are managed independently in order to implement
the security policy as accurately as possible. Consequently, it is an expensive
and unreliable proposition to modify the security policy and deploy it within
the entire infrastructure. Additionally, it is virtually impossible to obtain a con-
solidated view of the safeguards and security controls that are deployed within
the entire enterprise or the entire computing environment. This results in a poor
understanding of how a security policy is being enforced.
There is currently an increasing pressure on executives from customers, share-
holders and regulators to demonstrate best practice in the protection of the infor-
mation assets of the enterprise and its customers. Executives are forced to assure
that security is provided in a way that follows guidelines from such documents as
ISO2k7 [23, 24] and is in line with necessary legislation requirements such as UK
Data Protection Act (DPA) [58]. The ability to prove to external auditors the
compliance with required documents forces companies and virtual organisations
to provide security mechanisms which would enable a better understanding of
the enforcement of a security policy.
In the context of authorisation, security systems need a way of providing a
consolidated view of the access control policy that is enforced within a computing
environment. This is usually achieved by centralising policy administration and
decision components. Policies can be composed independently of the services
for which they are used. Those policies can be defined to meet compliance or
any other requirements. Moreover, centralising policies guarantees that those
policies are applied consistently among a set of possibly distributed resources
and facilitates audits of those policies. As discussed in [3], policy management
involves many different steps including writing, reviewing, testing, approving,
issuing, combining, analyzing, modifying, withdrawing, retrieving and enforcing
authorisation policies. Providing means of securing all those steps should be
considered mandatory.
Communication Performance. Authorisation decision is often based on in-
formation from different highly distributed components. Such situation occurs
when enforcement points reside in different domains than decision points and
decisions points additionally collect information from a distributed set of infor-
mation points. In such scenarios it is necessary to ensure that communication
between components of the security system is efficient in terms of the number
of messages that are sent between components and the size of those messages.
The protocol used for offloading authorisation from business services should
use a possibly small number of messages in order for access requests to be cor-
rectly evaluated. In decentralised approaches to authorisation every access re-
quest received by the enforcement point needs to be encapsulated in some form of
an access request decision query and sent for evaluation. One of the approaches
of minimising the number of interactions between components of the system is
the use of caching, as proposed in [61]. Enforcement points may cache decisions
made by decision points. Additionally, decision points may cache policies that
they would normally retrieve from administration points.
Caching can significantly reduce the number of messages that are exchanged
between components of the access control system but has certain drawbacks
that need to be addressed. At first, information stored in the cache memory
may not be up-to-date which may result in false positive or false negative access
control decisions. This reduces the flexibility of revoking old access control rules
or introducing new ones. This problem can be minimised by introducing time
constraints on validity of locally cached copies by different components of the
system. Moreover, components may only decide to cache information which does
not change frequently but is used more often than other information (e.g. only
a subset of infrequently changed but commonly used policies can be cached).
Another approach to minimising the number of messages that must be sent
between components of the authorisation system is to use policy syndication
as proposed in [57]. A global Policy Administration Point, which is managed
by a central authority, may hold a global security policy. Such policy is then
syndicated to more local PAP components residing in different administrative
domains or in the same domain in which syndication takes places. More local
PAP components can incorporate all changes or only those that are in line with
constraints imposed by authoritative bodies of those local PAPs. Reports can be
later sent back to more global PAP components or the syndication servers. When
access control decisions are to be made then policies are retrieved from locally
accessible administration points that are trusted to store up-to-date policies that
should be enforced in the computing environment. A hierarchy of such PAP
interactions can be created as depicted in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. A high-level view of the Policy Administration Point / Policy Syndication
Server hierarchy.
Communication between components of the authorisation infrastructure should
also aim to be based on lightweight messages that would not affect the overall
throughput of the computing environment. Such characteristic is particularly
important with regards to authorisation built on Web Service-based technology.
When messages used for carrying such information as access control decision
queries or responses are secured with Web Service-compliant standards, they
are significantly bigger then those which do not use any security mechanisms
[40]. In particular, exchanging security policies between components may con-
stitute a drawback if those policies consist of multiple rules. Because XACML
uses XML to encode access control policies then the size of policies and privilege
statements is significant due to the XML encoding overhead and verbosity of the
language.
Autonomy of Administration Domains. When resources are shared be-
tween different organisations within a Virtual Organisation environment then
some access control may be delegated in a cross-domain fashion. One domain
may decide to accept access control decisions that come from a different domain
and establish a trust relationship between components of both access control
systems. However, organisations that participate in VO environments should be
able to preserve their autonomy in making access control decisions. Each domain
typically will introduce their own access control rules that should be enforced
for each access request.
Approaching the challenge of preserving autonomy of separate domains can
be done with the use of authorities hierarchy. Each level in such hierarchy can
be responsible for defining access control rules of a different scope. An example
of this approach is discussed in [50] with regards to the PRIMA authorisation
system. In such system multiple entities are authoritative for resources at a
different level. For example, a site wide policy can be defined by the site authority
and a policy for single resources can be defined by individuals. In addition, there
may be authorities that have control over authorisation policies for entire Virtual
Organisations.
Each level of authorities may impose its own constraints on acceptable access
control rules. When such constraints result in conflicts then those can be resolved
using some of the proposed policy conflict resolution mechanisms that we have
already discussed in Section 3.1. The XACML standard itself provides profiles
that could address requirements regarding autonomy of administrative domains.
Those profiles extend appropriate schemas to describe administrative requests
and delegation policies [11, 13]. A more detailed discussion regarding delegation
in authorisation system is provided in the next section.
Access Control Delegation. As discussed in the previous section, a collabo-
rating party within a Virtual Organisation may delegate access control decision
making process to a different party of the same VO. Such delegation is typically
specified in administrative policies that define who is authorised to compose ac-
cess control rules for resources [55]. A centralised administrative policy is not
sufficient for multi-domain computing environments as collaborating parties may
not agree upon a single authority to grant and revoke authorisation rights. In
such cases, domains may use cooperative type administrative policies which re-
quire all collaborating parties to agree on authorisation rules.
Another approach that is well suited for multi-domain computing environ-
ments is a decentralised model of administrative policies. In such model each
domain has its own administrative policy and defines how much of its access
control decision making process should be delegated to other domains. When
such access is delegated to other domains then those domains may or may not
be able to delegate it further. This complicates the authorisation management
process as it is hard to track the rights for resources. As discussed in [55] revo-
cation of access control rights is also complex in such cases.
An example usage of delegation is that proposed in the PRIMA authorisation
system [50]. This system supports multiple authorities by allowing users as well
as administrative personnel to delegate access to resources for which they are
authoritative. Resource authorities can use the same mechanisms to grant priv-
ileges to other users and to issue policy statements for resources. The XACML
standard itself provides means of achieving delegation through the use of profiles.
We have discussed those profiles in Section 2.3.
Security of Access Control Systems. Access control systems protect re-
sources distributed among multiple parties within a multi-domain computing
environment. Just as resources itself, such systems need to be protected against
attacks. It is necessary to discuss security of authorisation systems in terms of
security of single components and security of interactions between those compo-
nents. Single components must be protected against illegal accesses to informa-
tion that they store or processes that they perform. This relates to access control
policies stored by administration points and the access control decision making
process done by decision points respectively. Interactions between components
must be protected to ensure that messages exchanged between those components
are communicated securely.
Access control policies need to be protected with access control rules. Mecha-
nisms used for such protection are typically implementation specific within each
computing environment. The approach discussed in [44] presents security mecha-
nisms for the authorisation infrastructure that are based on the same PEP/PDP
mechanisms that protect ordinary resources. This results in the authorisation
system being easier to administrate as all access control rules are specified us-
ing a single policy language with only one policy administration interface. The
security infrastructure can be flexibly managed using policies and does not rely
on hard-coded security rules. The authorisation for ordinary resources and for
access control policies is based on the same mechanism and a single policy lan-
guage. This results in checks on the security of such system being easier and less
error prone. Security for the authorisation system can be introduced in form of
a specialised service as discussed in [43].
Security of interactions between components needs to address confidentiality
and integrity of messages which are typical requirements for security in Web
Service-based computing environments [53]. Such messages as those carrying
access request queries need to be encrypted and signed. Encryption guarantees
that no information about access control policies or issued authorisation queries
is revealed [1]. Signatures guarantee authenticity of messages which is mandatory
to ensure that only valid policies are evaluated and that only valid access control
decisions are enforced [14]. Apart from message level security, the transport
protocol used to exchange those messages need to be protected as well. HTTP
can be secured with such mechanisms as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [35] or its
successor Transport Layer Security (TLS) [30].
4 Summary
This paper presents the state of the art in architecting authorisation mecha-
nisms for multi-domain computing environments. Such authorisation differs sig-
nificantly from the one used for single host or single domain computing systems
and imposes multiple challenges that need to be addressed. Components of the
authorisation system need to be able to interoperate with each other and must
understand every piece of information that is shared among them. This includes
the syntax and semantics of policies that are used for evaluation of access re-
quests and messages that are sent between components of the authorisation
system.
Authorisation components and security policies are highly distributed through-
out the entire computing environment and there is a need for manageability of
the system, its components and security policies. Separate and autonomous do-
mains that form multi-domain computing environments need to preserve their
autonomy and ability to define their own security requirements. Such security
requirements are often conflicting and there is a need for policy conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms. The authorisation system should additionally allow domains
to delegate some of the rights for resources that they own to other domains. We
show how authorisation systems could pose restrictions on such rights delegation.
Allowing for distributed access control rule specification poses a challenge of
efficient communication as well. Depending on the nature of access request types
in terms of their frequency or the size of data being exchanged there may be a
need to ensure that the intrinsic communication related to authorisation con-
stitutes a small part of the overall higher level protocol for accessing resources.
Additionally, the access control system needs security just as much as the re-
sources that it protects. In our discussion we show ways of addressing this issue
by specifying administration policies. We present advantages of securing the au-
thorisation system with its own security policies through examples of simplified
management and the ability of providing error and compliance checks of the
applied access control rules.
In our paper we present recognised implications of authorisation at a con-
ceptual level and with regards to existing standards and authorisation infras-
tructures for multi-domain computing environments built on Service Oriented
Architectures using Web Services as the underlying connection technology. As we
point out in our paper, architecting authorisation for such environments requires
deep understanding of various aspects of distributed access control. Addressing
all recognised challenges in building access control solutions should be considered
mandatory by security architects.
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